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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW -1955
In a well-reasoned opinion the Ohio Supreme Court reversed, indicating
that the driver was an employee of the service station, an independent con-
tractor.2 The decision is clearly in accord with accepted principles of
agency law. The only unusual feature of the case is that both the common
pleas court and the court of appeals felt otherwise.
The owner of a truck leased his truck to a common carrier in return for
a percentage of freight charges. The contract called for the owner to drive
and maintain the truck and specified that he was an independent contractor.
The plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the owner-driver and sued
-both the owner and the carrier. The common pleas court and the court
of appeals treated the -relation between owner and carrier as a joint adven-
ture and held them jointly liable. In Shaver v. Shirks Motor Express3 the
Supreme Court reversed, pointing out that there was no co-ownership of
the business and no sharing of profits. The parties were either master and
servant or employer and independent contractor. It makes no difference
which relationship existed because clearly both are liable. The owner is
liable for his own negligence and the carrier is liable by virtue of an I.CC.
Rule making the carrier liable for the operations of all leased vehicles 4
The point of the case is that they were not jointly liable, and therefore the
motion of the defendants to require the plaintiff to elect to proceed against
one or the other should have been granted.5
HUGH A. Ross
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Although a considerable number of cases dealing with appellate pro-
cedure were reported among the Ohio cases in the Northeastern series
during the year 1955, comparatively few offer distinctive features of new
or special interest which make them worthy of comment. A few cases
clarify the view of Ohio courts expressed in earlier cases and are, therefore,
briefly discussed.
In the case of Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co.,1 a share-
holders' derivative suit, the Supreme Court found in favor of the defendants
1 129 NXE.2d 865 (Ohio App. 1954).
2Councell v. Douglas, 163 Ohio St 292, 126 N.E.2d 597 (1955).
a 163 Ohio St. 484, 127 N.E.2d 355 (1955).
'The Ohio courts have held that similar state and federal regulations not only affect
the carrier's liability to a shipper, but also make the carrier liable in tort. Duncan
v. Evans, 134 Ohio St. 486, 17 N.E.2d 913 (1938).
' The rule is well-settled in Ohio that a plaintiff will be required to elect to sue either
master or servant and cannot sue them jointly. For a discussion of the Ohio cases
see Note, Joinder of Tort-Feasors it Ohio, 5 WEsT. REs. L REv. 417 (1954).
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and entered an order with respect to its judgment, discharging an attach-
ment and releasing a garnishee on the ground that the plantiffs had no right
or capacity to bring the action, but ordering that such judgment be stayed
pending appeal, upon condition that a motion for new trial and notices
of appeal be seasonably filed, and that a supersedeas bond be filed upon
appeal in an amount determined by the court in its order. The Supreme
Court, in a well-reasoned opinion, held that the order was one incidental
to final judgment, was not merely an order sustaining a motion to discharge
an attachment before judgment, and was, therefore, an appealable order.
Another case of some interest upon the question of final order is City
of Cleveland v. Forkapa,2 an eminent domain proceeding in which the
court of common pleas had entered an order requiring a condemnee to va-
cate the premises at an earlier date than originally ordered because of
changed conditions growing out of requirements in the construction of the
Cleveland Transit System. After a motion by the defendants to stay the
order had been dismissed by the trial court, the court of appeals held that,
in the absence of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, this order
was not a final order from which an appeal might be taken. 0
The nature of prejudicial error was considered in several cases, in one
of which, Potter v. Baker,3 the Supreme Court points out that the trial judge,
in determining whether a spontaneous exclamation is admissible as an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule, must decide certain questions of fact, and that,
if a decision in this regard is a reasonable one, an appellate court may not
disturb it, even though the reviewing court, if sitting as a trial court, would
have made a different decision.
In Centrello v. Basky,4 a personal injury case, the Supreme Court held
that, although contributory negligence based upon carelessness and assump-
tion of risk, the essence of which is adventurous conduct, are not identical,
nevertheless, they are related, and that where in returning a general verdict
for the defendants on evidence upon which the jury might have found
either that the defendant was negligent, or that the plaintiff was contribu-
torily negligent, or had heedlessly exposed himself to danger, the court
might properly charge on both contributory negligence and assumption
of risk.
In this case the court also discussed a rule of long standing in Ohio,
the two-issue rule, pointing out that when a general verdict is returned in
the absence of interrogatories the answers to which might indicate which
of two issues were determinative in the case, it will be presumed that all
1163 Ohio St. 606, 128 N.E.2d 16 (1955).
'126 N.E.2d 147 (Ohio App. 1952).
'160 Ohio St. 488, 124 N.E.2d 140 (1955).
'164 Ohio St. 41, 128 N.E.2d 80 (1955).
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issues were resolved in favor of the prevailing party where one of the two
issues had been presented free of error.
In the case of Hurt v. Transportation Cornpany,5 the court held that
no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge was present in the
granting of a motion for a new trial as to one of the defendants when
the plaintiff had refused to accept a remittitur, such action not constituting
a final order from which an appeal might be taken.
An interesting question was presented in -the case of Maas v. N.Y.C
& St. L. R. Co.6 In this -personal injury case the trial judge refused to give
a requested written charge before argument that by virtue of the Internal
Revenue Act of 1954 any amount received by the .plaintiff as compensa-
tion for personal injuries would be exempt from federal income tax and
that this situation must be taken into consideration by the jury in arriving
at a verdict. The court of appeals confirmed the trial count, citing several
cases in point decided by the courts of other states. This is probably the
first time this question has been considered in Ohio.
The elements of a chancery case were again considered by the Supreme
Court in Sessions v. Skelton,7 in which a testamentary trustee, also acting
individually,- asked construction of the provisions of a will authorizing
certain substitutions in a trust. An appeal from probate court up6n ques-
tions of law and fact had been perfected to the court of appeals which, on
motion, had dismissed the appeal, retaining the cause for determination of
questions of law only. The court held that, although an action for de-
claratory judgment is neither one strictly in equity or at law, but is clearly
a procedural remedy, this action involved a testamentary trust affecting
charitable organizations, and was, therefore, of an equitable nature.
Another action for declaratory judgment, based upon facts which make
it easily distinguishable from the above Supreme Court case, -in that it
did not involve a charitable trust, was considered by the Court of Appeals
for Montgomery County in Fletcher v. Stanton,8 the court in this case hold-
ing that -the action was based upon statute, had never, therefore, been
cognizable in chancery, and hence was not appealable on questions of
law and fact.
The sufficiency of a notice of appeal under the provisions of Revised
Code section 2505.04 was considered by the Supreme Court in Richards v.
Industrial Commission,9 in which the court, basing its view on this point
upon a number of earlier opinions, held that the filing of a notice of appeal
'123 N.E.2d 39 (Ohio App. 1954).
0128 N.E.2d 166 (Ohio App, 1955).
S163 Ohio St. 409, 127 N.E.2d 378 (1955).
8124 N.E.2d 493 (Ohio App. 1953).
'163 Ohio St. 439, 127 N.E.2d 402 (1955).
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